Quantitative Methods in Economic Analysis I

Instructor: [Arne Hallam]

Class Location & Time: 274 Heady MW 11:00-12:00 F 13:00-14:00

Course Outline: Syllabus

Functions and Equations	Systems of Equations
Univariate Calculus	Simple Optimization
Convexity and Optimization	Multivariate Calculus
Multivariate Optimization	Simple Constrained Optimization
Introduction to Matrix_Algebra	Matrix Algebra
Geometry of_Matrices	Quadratic_Forms
Characteristic Vectors	General Constrained Optimization
Implicit Function Theorem	Comparative Statics
Econonomic_Optimality

Mathematics for Economic Theory

Instructor: Julio Dávila
36 McNeil, (215) 898-7788
davilaj@ssc.upenn.edu
office hours: Monday from 16:00 to 18:00

Teaching Assistant: Braz Camargo
531 McNeil
braz@econ.upenn.edu
office hours: Wednesday from 16:00 to 18:00

Meetings: Monday and Wednesday, from 10:30 to 12:00 at 395 McNeil.

pdf Syllabus

pdf 0. Introduction
pdf 1. Relations, Orders, Functions, Fields...
pdf 2. Constrained Maximization
pdf 3. Metric Spaces
pdf 4. Functions between metric spaces
pdf 5. Correspondences between metric spaces
pdf 6. The theorem of the maximum
pdf 7. The standard dynamic programming problem
pdf 8. Vector Spaces
pdf 9. Brower's Fixed Point Theorem
pdf 10. Approximations and Selections of Correspondences
pdf 11. Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem and Nash's Theorem
pdf 12. Linear Functions
pdf 13. Differentiable Functions
pdf 14. The implicit function theorem

Game Theory with Professor Ben Polak

This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.

Click session titles below to access audio, video, and course materials.

1. Introduction: five first lessons

2. Putting yourselves into other people's shoes

3. Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem

4. Best responses in soccer and business partnerships

5. Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs

6. Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot

7. Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line

8. Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization

9. Mixed strategies in theory and tennis

10. Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes

11. Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium

12. Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles

Midterm Exam

13. Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions

14. Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages

15. Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats

16. Backward induction: reputation and duels

17. Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining

18. Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection

19. Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments

20. Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition

21. Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game

22. Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing

23. Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education

24. Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse

Final Exam

Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict

Linda Bilmes, writer

Linda Bilmes, expert in budgeting and public finance at Harvard's Kennedy School, discusses the true cost of the Iraq conflict, as calculated in her new book, co-authored with Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz. What expense items have been hidden from American taxpayers? What future costs does war entail? What trade-offs does the cost of war impose on the U.S. economy?

File type: mp3
DOWNLOAD HERE